Measuring ‘Closeness’ in 3-Candidate Elections: Methodology and an Application to Strategic Voting by Kselman, Daniel et al.
Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science 
10-15-2020 
Measuring ‘Closeness’ in 3-Candidate Elections: Methodology and 





Austin Horng-En Wang 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, austin.wang@unlv.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/political_science_articles 
 Part of the Models and Methods Commons, Political Theory Commons, and the Politics and Social 
Change Commons 
Repository Citation 
Kselman, D., Niou, E., Wang, A. H. (2020). Measuring ‘Closeness’ in 3-Candidate Elections: Methodology 
and an Application to Strategic Voting. Electoral Studies, 68 1-11. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102220 
This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV 
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Article in any way that is permitted by the 
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from 
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself. 
 
This Article has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu. 
Measuring ‘Closeness’ in 3-Candidate Elections: 
















Past research suggests that voter behavior is influenced by perceptions of electoral 
competitiveness. For example, when an election is perceived to be close, voters will be 
more likely to turnout and/or cast strategic votes for their second-most preferred 
candidate. Operationalizing electoral competitiveness in three-candidate elections 
presents previously unrecognized methodological challenges.  This paper first shows 
that many past strategies for measuring ‘closeness’ in three-candidate contests have 
violated at least one of three basic properties that any such measure should satisfy. 
We then propose a new measurement grounded in probability ratios, and prove 
formally that ratio-indices satisfy these axiomatic criteria. Empirical analyses using 
this new index provide novel and nuanced findings on the extent and causes of 
strategic voting in the 2010 British general election. The paper’s operational strategy 










 The notion that voter choice is driven by both voters’ preferences and their 
expectations over the set of possible electoral outcomes figures prominently in the study 
of voter behavior. This is particularly true of research grounded in the Calculus of Voting, 
an expected utility model in which both voter turnout and voter choice are affected by the 
election’s competitiveness, or closeness, and in particular the likelihood that voters are 
‘pivotal’ in creating or breaking 1st place ties between candidates (Downs 1957; Riker and 
Ordeshook 1968; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1972; Black 1978; Hoffman 1982).1 The 
argument is intuitive: when an election is close, voters will understand that their votes are 
more ‘meaningful’. In turn they should be more likely to turnout,2 and in some cases to 
cast strategic votes for their 2nd-most preferred candidate.3  
 
1 Green and Shapiro (1994) famously criticize the Calculus of Voting for failing to explain 
voter turnout. For the interested reader, Part VI of the Supporting Information file argues 
that, even if this is true, expected-utility may nonetheless be a perfectly viable framework 
for modeling voter choice. 
2 Although by no means exhaustive, for additional work on turnout and competitiveness 
see Hinich and Ordeshook (1969), Rosenthal and Sen (1973), Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974), 
Cox (1988), Grofman et al. (1998), Endersby et al. (2002), and Adams et al. (2006). 
3 A large amount of past research on strategic voting is reviewed in the process of 
developing Sections 2 through 4 below. For a schematic review of more recent 
contributions see Cox (1997); Fey (1997); Alvarez and Nagler (2000); Blais (2000); Niou 
(2001); Fisher (2004); Fieldhouse et al. (2007); Merolla and Stephenson (2007); Myatt 
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Measuring closeness in 3-candidate plurality rule contests presents an under-
appreciated methodological challenge. This paper’s first substantive contribution is to 
unearth an implicit debate among scholars of voter choice as to the proper methodology. 
Sections 2a and 2b demonstrate that, among the many interesting and creative proposals 
(e.g. Rosenthal and Sen 1973; Black 1978; Cain 1978; Abramson et. al 1992; Ordeshook 
and Zeng 1997), all past proxies of closeness in 3-candidate contests violate at least one of 
three basic Properties that such measures should satisfy. Having identified the challenge, 
Section 2c demonstrates formally that a proxy measure grounded in probability ratios 
satisfies these axiomatic criteria.  
Section 3 then presents the Calculus of Voting and its hypotheses regarding 
strategic choice, and proposes a step-by-step strategy for testing these hypotheses the 
proposed ratio measure. Using the 2010 British Election Study (BES),4 Section 4 provides 
statistical tests of these hypotheses, whose results provide novel insight into the causes of 
strategic voting. Firstly, while past research has emphasized the pairwise comparison of 
one’s most-preferred and second-most preferred candidates, our results suggest that 
strategic voting is driven almost entirely by viability comparisons involving one’s least-
 
(2007); Herrmann and Pappi (2008); Kselman and Niou (2010); Meffert and Gschwend 
(2011); Kiewiet (2013); and Hillygus and Treul (2014), and Eggers and Vivyan (2017). 
4 For reasons discussed at greater length below, this data source and election present the 
ideal context for a complete test of the paper’s methodology and core hypotheses. We 
conduct robustness checks on the 1988 Canadian General Election Study (CNES), which 
also meets the necessary criteria. 
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preferred candidate. Put otherwise, voters use their least-preferred candidate as an ‘anchor 
point’ when deciding who to vote for, rather than making explicit comparisons between 
their two preferred candidates. We also demonstrate that the impact of expectations on vote 
choice is contingent on a voter’s preference profile. For example, among voters who only 
mildly prefer their second preference to their least-preferred candidate, increasing the 
closeness of the contest between these two candidates has little impact on the likelihood of 
strategic voting. Finally, we demonstrate that past estimates of strategic behavior may have 
been influenced by the presence of distinct forms of tactical choice such as protest voting; 
and propose a strategy for purging estimates of this potential bias. Taken together, these 
findings represent some of the most precise, but also nuanced, evidence to date in favor of 
expected-utility maximization as a model of voter choice. 
The Concluding Section 5 discusses additional applications and extensions. While 
the current paper’s application is to strategic voting in 3-candidate plurality rule elections, 
its methodology should be relevant to studies of strategic voting in more complex 
environments (e.g. N>3 candidates, coalition government, etc.). As well, it should be 
applicable to future studies of voter turnout, protest voting, and campaign contributions,5 
where electoral competitiveness is also a relevant consideration. Moving beyond the world 
of popular elections, our measure of closeness should be relevant for studies of 
instrumental and tactical voting in democratic legislatures (Enelow 1981; Calvert and 
Fenno 1994), as well as to the study of shareholder elections in private corporations, whose 
 
5 See Bouton et al. (2018) on the relationship between competitiveness and campaign 
contributions. 
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importance has increased over time (Yermack 2010). Finally, the Conclusion identifies 
avenues for future research into the theoretical and empirical comparison of proxy vs. 
explicit measures of closeness, a distinction to which we now turn. 
 
1a. Proxy vs. Explicit Measures of Closeness 
Our approach to measuring closeness follows most past research, in that it aims to 
create a reliable empirical proxy for the probability of casting a pivotal vote in a plurality 
election. Rather than proxy measures, a set of recent papers generate explicit values of the 
probability of being pivotal (Herrmann et al. 2016; Fisher and Myatt 2017; Eggers and 
Vivyan 2017). These papers model voter beliefs over electoral outcomes as a probability 
density function over the set of all possible 3-dimensional electoral outcomes.6 One can then 
extract the closeness measures by integrating over the set of outcomes in which a voter is 
‘pivotal’ for creating or breaking a 1st-place tie between two candidates. Although very 
small, these values are greater than ‘0’.  
This approach presents the value of precision: it specifies a detailed belief structure 
for voters, and extracts closeness measures directly from that belief structure. It thus 
represents an improvement in our inductive ability to calculate closeness. That being said, 
just as with the proxy measures studied in this paper, there are a multitude of different 
functional forms these explicit measures can take, and the decision as to how to represent 
baseline voter expectations becomes important. For example, Herrmann et al. (2016) use a 
 
6 The density function’s maximum occurs at the observed electoral outcome from the 
previous electoral cycle (or current cycle in the case of Eggers and Vivyan 2017), and its 
value decreases as one moves further and further from this observed outcome. 
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multinomial distribution to model voter beliefs, whereas and Fisher and Myatt (2017) and 
Eggers and Vivyan (2017) use a dirichlet distribution, each of which makes specific 
assumptions about voter expectations. Our aim here is to provide a logical framework with 
which to evaluate any functional form used to measure closeness, whether proxy or explicit. 
Just as with proxy measures, explicit measures grounded in probability density functions 
which meet the criteria developed in Section 2 would be judged superior. The Conclusion 
proposes future theoretical work which, although technically challenging, could serve to 
identify the general class of probability density functions which satisfy the theoretical 
criteria developed in Section 2.  
All of this begs the question: what impact does functional form have on substantive 
empirical findings? Section 4 demonstrates this paper’s proxy for closeness, which satisfies 
Section 2’s theoretical criteria, performs both differently and better than closeness proxies 
from past studies, with one important exception and informative exception (Ordeshook and 
Zeng 1997). Future research should also compare the performance of our proxy measure 
with explicit measures of closeness. Our hunch, based on the evidence in this paper, is that 
all measurement strategies, whether proxy or explicit, that satisfy Properties 1-3 will 
generate similar substantive findings. We return to these issues in the Conclusion, which 
suggests that the proxy-based and explicit measurement approaches should be 
complementary and mutually informative; and that both will benefit from research on the 





2. Measuring ‘Closeness’ in 3-Candidate Contests 
In a 3-candidate plurality rule election, define 𝑝𝑗 as the probability that a voter gives 
their 
thj  preference of winning the electoral contest (𝑗 ∈ {1,2,3}): 𝑝1 is the probability their 
most-preferred candidate wins, 𝑝2 is the probability their second-preference wins, etc. 
Measuring 𝑝𝑗 for individual voters is an important first step in generating an index of the 
electoral competitiveness between two candidates. Some studies use state- or district-level 
vote-shares from previous electoral cycles as a proxy for these probabilities (e.g. Cain 
1978; Alvarez and Nagler 2000): if party j received vote share 35% in a particular electoral 
district at time ‘t’, then survey respondents from said district are assigned the value 𝑝𝑗 =
35% in election ‘t+1’.7 While presenting numerous advantages, these approaches eliminate 
the possibility for individual idiosyncrasies, and more generally for within district variance 
in expectations across voters.8 To avoid these issues, some papers measure 𝑝𝑗 with the 
probabilities of winning assessments that respondents provide in public opinion surveys 
(e.g. Abramson et al., 1992; Merolla and Stephensen 2007). This ‘subjective’ approach 
 
7 Recent innovations go a step further, using multi-level regression and post-stratification 
techniques to extract district-level forecasts from national surveys; and then using these 
vote forecasts as a measure of  𝑝𝑗 (Hanretty et al. 2016, 2018; Eggers and Vivyan 2017).  
8 Cain (1978) and Alvarez and Nagler (2000) also assume that voters make a 1-to-1 
translation of candidates’ expected vote shares into their expected probabilities of winning. 
As addressed in Sections 4 and 5 below, the translation of expected vote shares into 
likelihoods of winning is characterized by non-linearities. 
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allows for within-district variance and greater precision, but is susceptible to respondents’ 
biases and cognitive constraints. 
In this paper, we remain agnostic as to the best strategy for measuring perceptions 
of a candidate’s probability of winning 𝑝𝑗.
9 Our focus is rather on how the raw probabilities 
of winning 𝑝𝑗 and 𝑝𝑘 are used to generate a closeness index 𝑝𝑗𝑘, capturing the perceived 
likelihood that a voter is pivotal in creating or breaking a 1st place tie between their 
thj  and 
thk  preferences. As such, 𝑝12 represents the probability of being pivotal between their first- 
and second-preferences, 𝑝13 is the probability of being pivotal between their first- and last-
preferences, and 𝑝23 is the probability of being pivotal between their second- and last-
preferences. One common and obvious proxy for the closeness in 2-candidate contests is 
𝑝𝑗𝑘 = 1 − |𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑘|, the absolute difference between the two competitors’ expected 
probabilities of winning.10  The indicator, which ranges from 0 to 1, is of course not a direct 
measure of 𝑝𝑗𝑘, which will be small in large electorates. However, the measure works as a 
proxy because it captures the proper comparative statics: it increases as the race between 
the two candidates becomes closer, with the highest value ‘1’ occurring when both 
candidates have a 50% chance of winning. 
 
9 Indeed, the paper’s core empirical analyses use data from the 2010 British Election Study 
(BES) precisely because this provides the best opportunity to replicate our analysis with 
both objective and subjective data. 
10 Cox (1988) analyzes different operational strategies for measuring closeness in 2-
candidate contests. 
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In three candidate contests this difference measure no longer works. Take two 
situations, one where a voter’s first- and second-preferences each have a 20% chance of 
winning (𝑝1 = 𝑝2 = 20%) while their least-preferred candidate has a 60% choice of 
winning (𝑝3 = 60%); and one where a voter’s first and second preferences each have a 
50% chance of winning (𝑝1 = 𝑝2 = 50%) while their least-preferred candidate has a 0% 
choice of winning (𝑝3 = 0%). In both cases the absolute difference measure yields 𝑝12 =
1, but the second voter is clearly more likely to be pivotal than the first, since the likelihood 
of a 1st place tie between her top two preferences is much higher. In words, a two-
dimensional difference measure fails to incorporate information about the two candidates’ 
relative viability vis-à-vis the third candidate, and thus is missing important information. 
 
2a. An Axiomatic Approach 
 
To generalize this argument, this paper takes an axiomatic approach to the challenge 
of measuring 𝑝𝑗𝑘 in 3-candidate contests: we begin by setting forth a series of properties 
which any measure of 𝑝𝑗𝑘 should satisfy, and then develop an operational strategy to satisfy 
these criteria. The first two properties relate to the comparative statics that any measure of 
closeness in 3-candidate contests should satisfy, and are labeled Plurality Margin and 
Mutual Viability. 
 
• Property 1 (Plurality Margin): Assume j is the expected plurality winner. Then, if 
any of the three candidates’ vote shares is held constant, the closeness of the race 




To demonstrate the importance of Property 1, consider two voters who believe their most-
preferred candidate will place first, their second-most-preferred candidate will place second, 
and their least-preferred candidate will place last in the election. The first voter has 𝑝1 =
60%, 𝑝2 = 30%, 𝑝3 = 10% while the second voter has 𝑝1 = 50%, 𝑝2 = 40%, 𝑝3 = 10%. 
Both voters expect their least-preferred candidate to be the loser, and this candidate’s 
probability of winning is held constant at 10%. However the probability of a 1st place tie 
between their first- and second-preferences 𝑝12 should be higher for the second voter, for 
whom the expected margin separating them is smaller. 
 
• Property 2 (Mutual Viability): Holding their expected probability separation 
constant, the closeness of the race between j and k (𝑝𝑗𝑘) must increase with their 
shared likelihood of winning the election against the third candidate. 
 
To demonstrate the importance of Property 2, return to the example above where one voter 
has expectations 𝑝1 = 20%, 𝑝2 = 20%, 𝑝3 = 60% while a second has expectations 𝑝1 =
50%, 𝑝2 = 50%, 𝑝3 = 0%. In both cases the voters’ first- and second-preference have equal 
probabilities of winning; however the probability of a 1st place tie between their first- and 
second-preferences 𝑝12 should clearly be higher for the second voter. 
Creating a measure for jkp  which displays the proper comparative statics is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for measuring closeness in 3-candiate contests. In 
addition, any such measure must satisfy the following Absolute Size criterion:  
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• Property 3 (Absolute Size): The probability of a 1st place tie between the two leading 
candidates must be higher than the probability of any 1st place tie which includes the 
trailing candidate.  
 
For example, among voters who perceive their most-preferred candidate to be winning, their  
second-most preferred candidate to be in 2nd place, and their least-preferred candidate to be 
losing (𝑝1 > 𝑝2 > 𝑝3), Property 3 requires that 𝑝12 > 𝑝13, 𝑝23.  
 As discussed in Section 5 (and Supporting Information Part IV, pages 7-9), these 
three Properties could (and perhaps should…) be complemented with additional criteria. For 
the moment, they constitute a minimalistic and intuitive core. Holding any of the three 
candidates’ expected vote shares constant, the probability of a 1st-place tie between the 
expected plurality winner and a second candidate should increase as the race between those 
two candidates tightens (Property 1). Holding the margin separating two candidates constant, 
the probability of a first-place tie should increase as their shared chances against the third 
candidate improve (Property 2). Finally, the likelihood of a 1st place tie between the top two 
candidates should be higher than the likelihood of a 1st place tie involving the trailing 
candidate (Property 3).  
 
2b. Past Strategies for Measuring Closeness in 3-Candidate Contests 
 
Before developing our measurement, we demonstrate that past proxies of 𝑝𝑗𝑘 in 3-
candidate contests do not simultaneously satisfy Properties 1-3.11 These studies have 
 
11 The Conclusion discusses the relationship between Properties 1-3 and past explicit 
measures of 𝑝𝑗𝑘. 
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employed a wide variety of approaches, including an absolute difference approach (e.g. Cain 
1978; Abramson et al. 1992; Blais and Nadeau 1996), a conditional difference approach 
(Rosenthal and Sen 1973), a multiplicative approach (Ordeshook and Zeng 1997), and 
Euclidean geometry (Black 1978; Herrmann and Pappi 2008). Abramson et al. (1992) use 
the absolute difference between the two candidates’ probability of winning |𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑘| to 
capture closeness in multi-candidate American Primaries. While this is technically a measure 
of ‘distance’, it can be rescaled as in the two-party context to capture closeness:  𝑝𝑗𝑘 = 1 −
|𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑘|. In contrast, Cain (1978) uses the reciprocal of the margin 𝑝𝑗𝑘 =
1
|𝑝𝑗−𝑝𝑘|
  to rescale 
the margin as a measure of closeness.  
Regardless of the functional form adopted, approaches grounded in the absolute 
difference fail to satisfy Properties 2 and 3. Regarding Property 2 we’ve already mentioned 
the comparison of two voters one with 𝑝1 = 20%, 𝑝2 = 20%, 𝑝3 = 60% and a second with  
𝑝1 = 50%, 𝑝2 = 50%, 𝑝3 = 0%. The difference measure 𝑝𝑗𝑘 = 1 − |𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑘| would assign 
these voters identical scores of 𝑝12 = 1, but a 1
st-place tie between one’s first- and second-
preferences should clearly be lower for the first voter, since in this case their third-preference 
is the clear favorite to win. As well, consider a voter with expectations 𝑝1 = 60%, 𝑝2 =
30%, 𝑝3 = 10%. By the absolute difference measure 𝑝𝑗𝑘 = 1 − |𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑘| the value of 
𝑝12 = .7 < 𝑝23 = .8, which violates Property 3: the probability of a 1
st place tie must be 
higher for the two leading candidates than for the two trailing candidates. 
In their piece on turnout and abstention in French elections, Rosenthal and Sen 
(1973) present a conditional difference measure which is consistent with Properties 1 and 3, 
but which does not rectify the above problem regarding Property 2. Their measure conditions 
the difference in probability of winning between candidates j  and k  on their shared 
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closeness to the expected plurality winner, denoted by ?̂?. In particular, their function for the 
probability of a 1st place tie between j and k: 
                          𝑝𝑗𝑘 = (1 − |𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑘|). (1 − ?̂? + max [𝑝𝑗 , 𝑝𝑘]).                             (1) 
Note that when either j  or k  is the candidate with the highest probability of winning, 
equation (1) reduces to 𝑝𝑗𝑘 = 1 − |𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑘|, the same difference measures as above, which 
thus suffers from similar problems regarding Property 2. For example, compare two voters 
one with 𝑝1 = 52.5%, 𝑝2 = 47.5%, 𝑝3 = 0% and a second with 𝑝1 = 40%, 𝑝2 =
35%, 𝑝3 = 25%. The conditional measure would assign these voters identical scores of 
𝑝12 = .95, but by Property 2 a 1
st-place tie between one’s first- and second-preferences 
should be higher for the first voter, since in this case the race is an entirely two-way race 
between those two candidates.  
Black (1978) measures the closeness of a race between candidates j and k as the 
Euclidean distance between a voter’s actual position and the position which would make 
these two candidates equal, holding the third candidate’s vote share constant.12 More 
particularly, in a 3-candidate race with candidates j, k, and l, define a voter’s expectation 
vector as {𝑝𝑗 , 𝑝𝑘, 𝑝𝑙}, and consider the Euclidean distance between this vector and a second 
vector {?̂?𝑗, ?̂?𝑘, 𝑝𝑙}, where the latter represents the vector in which j  and k  would be tied for 
the 1st place, holding lp  constant. For example, for the starting vector {. 5, .3, .2}, the 
associated vector would be {. 4, .4, .2}. The Euclidian distance between these two vectors is:           
 
12 The equations therein contain a minor error, which was corrected by Herrmann and Pappi 
(2008). 
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This represents a creative effort at incorporating the third candidate’s position into the 












= . Put otherwise, in the 
end this formula can be reduced to a difference-based measure, which in turn does not satisfy 
Properties 2 and 3 (demonstration omitted for redundancy). 
Adopting a very different approach, Ordeshook and Zeng (1997) propose a 
multiplicative measure 𝑝𝑗𝑘 = 𝑝𝑗𝑝𝑘 which solves the above problems associated with 
Properties 2 and 3, but in exchange introduces new problems with regards to Property 1. To 
see this, compare a voter with expectations 𝑝1 = 60%, 𝑝2 = 30%, 𝑝3 = 10% to a voter with 
expectations 𝑝1 = 40%, 𝑝2 = 30%, 𝑝3 = 30%. By the multiplicative measure 𝑝12 will be 
higher for the first voter than for the second voter: (. 6 ×  .3) > (.4 ×  .3). In fact, by 
Property 1 it is the reverse that should obtain: the first voter perceives the front-runner to be 
much further ahead (30% ahead vs. 10% ahead), while the second voter perceives a much 
closer 1st-place race between her first- and second-preferences. 
 
2c. An Axiomatically Sound Measure of Closeness 
 We now present a distinct proxy measure which satisfies all three properties, and 
which has the benefits of simplicity and transparency. It is grounded in probability ratios of 
the form 𝑝𝑗𝑘 =
𝑝𝑗
𝑝𝑘
 where 𝑝𝑗 < 𝑝𝑘 such that 𝑝𝑗𝑘 ≤ 1. It is straight-forward to show that 
probability ratios satisfy Properties 1 and 2 (theoretical proofs in Supporting Information 
Part I). Regarding Property 1, consider one voter with expectations 𝑝1 = 60%, 𝑝2 =
 14 
30%, 𝑝3 = 10% and a second voter with 𝑝1 = 40%, 𝑝2 = 30%, 𝑝3 = 30%. In contrast to 







. These ratio measures also satisfy Property 2. Again compare two voters, the 
first of whom believes 𝑝1 = 52.5%, 𝑝2 = 47.5%, 𝑝3 = 0% and the second of whom 
believes 𝑝1 = 40%, 𝑝2 = 35%, 𝑝3 = 25%. Although the margin separating the voter’s first- 







Given this discussion, it is tempting to use these simple ratios to measure the 
closeness of a race between any two candidates. However, it is also straightforward to see 
that simple ratios may, under certain circumstances, violate Property 3. For example, 
consider a voter with 𝑝1 = 24%, 𝑝2 = 26%, 𝑝3 = 50%. If we use simple ratios to 






, violating Property 3. To avoid this violation, we 
need to develop a slightly modified approach to measuring the closeness of the race between 
the election’s two trailing candidates.  
Suppose that among candidates j, k, and l, candidate l is the expected plurality 
winner. Consider the following measurement strategy: 
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By conditioning the closeness score for the two trailing candidates on the size of the 
plurality winner’s lead, we ensure that (3) satisfies Property 3. The following Proposition, 
proven in Part I of the Supporting Information file, confirms the viability of the ratio 
measurement strategy codified in (3): 
* Proposition 1: Suppose that among candidates j, k, and l, candidate l is the expected 



























p  satisfies Properties 1-3. 
Proposition 1 applies to voters who express strict expectation rankings. For voters who 
believe that one candidate is in the lead and that the other two candidates have an equal 
























For voters who believe that two front-runner candidates have equal chances of winning, 


















3. Closeness and Strategic Voting 
Section 2 developed a new strategy for measuring 𝑝𝑗𝑘, the probability of creating 
or breaking a tie between one’s candidates jth and kth preferences in 3-candiate contests. 
We now demonstrate that these closeness parameters are crucial for the study of strategic 
voting. At its foundation, the logic of strategic voting is grounded in expected utility 
maximization: I choose a candidate who I prefer less, but who has a better chance of 
winning, to avoid ‘wasting’ my vote. The Calculus of Voting (COV) is an expected utility 
model of voting behavior applicable to winner-take-all elections, and was first proposed 
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by Downs (1957) and formalized by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and McKelvey and 
Ordeshook (1972). While, the COV was originally applied to the question of turnout, it can 
also be used to derive predictions as to the conditions under which voters will cast strategic 
votes for their second-preference in 3-candidate contests.  
According to the COV a voter will cast a strategic vote if and only if the expected 
utility of choosing their second-preference is higher than that of choosing their first-
preference. Define 𝑈𝑗 as a voter’s utility for having their thj  preference win the election, 
such that by construction 𝑈1 ≥ 𝑈2 ≥ 𝑈3. Furthermore, define 𝐸𝑗 as a voter’s expected 
utility for choosing candidate j. From past formal research (Black 1978; Hoffman 1982; 
Fisher 2004; Kselman and Niou 2010) we reproduce the following condition for 
strategically choosing their second-preference:             
                                                   𝐸2 > 𝐸1  if and only if 
 
                          𝑝23 ∙ (𝑈2 − 𝑈3) > 2𝑝12 ∙ (𝑈1 − 𝑈2) + 𝑝13 ∙ (𝑈1 − 𝑈3) .
14                     (4) 
 
When the left-hand side is greater than the right-hand side, the voter’s optimal choice 
should be to choose their second-most-preferred candidate rather than their most-preferred 
candidate. To simplify the result for empirical analysis, we now implement a standard 
expected utility normalization (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953). Define 
1U , 2U , and 
 
14 Inequality (5) employs the assumption that adjacent probabilities in comparable 
outcome spaces are equal (see also McKelvey & Ordeshook 1972, p. 51). This assumption 
is purely expository, and in no way affects result’s implications or generality.  
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2U . We can then rearrange (4) above as follows: 
                                                    𝐸2 > 𝐸1  if and only if 
                                            𝜎𝑝23 − 2(1 − 𝜎)𝑝12 − 𝑝13 > 0 .                                          (5) 
 
Henceforth, we will refer to a voter’s first-preference as ‘1’, her second-preference 
as ‘2’, and her third-preference as ‘3’. A voter will cast a strategic vote for 2 if the left-
hand side of (5) is greater than 0. The likelihood of strategic voting should thus decrease 
in 𝑝13, i.e. choosing 2 becomes less likely when 1 and 3 are in a close race for first place. 
As well, the likelihood of strategic voting should increase in 𝑝23 and decrease in 𝑝12, i.e. 
choosing 2 becomes more (less) likely when 2 and 3 (1 and 2) are in a close race for first 
place. However, and importantly, these effects should be dependent on the size of  . For 
large , at which voters are fairly indifferent between 1 and 2, increases in 𝑝23 should have 
a strong positive effect on the likelihood of choosing 2, since their biggest concern is with 
keeping 3 out of office. In contrast, for lower values of   where voters are more indifferent 
between 2 and 3, the positive effect of 𝑝23 should be less pronounced. As for 𝑝12, at larger 
values of   it should have little negative effect on the likelihood of choosing 2, since voters 
are fairly indifferent between 1 and 2. The negative effect should become more pronounced 
at smaller values of  , when 1 is highly preferred to 2.  
 
3a. Measurement and Operationalization 
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 While some research has studied strategic voting using aggregate-level data (Cain 
1978; Galbraith and Rae 1989; Johnston and Pattie 1991; Cox 1997; Bawn 1999),15 the 
most promising tests of an individual-level theory like the COV are grounded in individual-
level analyses.16 In particular, to test the above inequality we need survey data from a 3-
candidate plurality-rule election which allows us to operationalize: a.) a respondent’s utility 
for a candidate (𝑈𝑗); b.) the ‘closeness’ of a contest between two candidates (𝑝𝑗𝑘); and c.) 
the respondent’s vote choice.17 For reasons which will become clear below, the most 
promising data set for testing our model is the 2010 British Election Study (BES), although 
 
15 Aggregate level evidence is suggestive but suffers from problems of ecological inference 
(Freedman et al. 1991; Achen and Shivley 1995; King 1997).  
16 A distinct set of papers uses respondents’ self-reported motivations (Heath et al. 1991; 
Niemi et al. 1992; Franklin et. al 1994; Fisher 2004; Blais et al. 2005; Artabe and 
Gardeazabal 2014), identifying as strategic anyone who reports having been motivated by 
considerations of ‘viability’ and/or the desire to avoid ‘wasted-votes’. Alvarez and Nagler 
(2000) suggest that the higher overall rates of strategic behavior often uncovered by such 
studies may result from response bias in post-election surveys. 
17 We use expected vote choices from pre-election surveys rather than reported vote 
choices in post-election surveys. The results are qualitatively identical with data on 
reported vote choice in post-election surveys (available upon request).  
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the 1988 Canadian National Election Study (CNES) also meets the core requirements, and 
serves to validate the robustness of statistical results.18 
We use Feeling Thermometers, which ask survey respondents to report their general 
‘attraction’ to a party or candidate on a 1-100 scale, to measure a voter’s utility for a 
particular party (Cain 1978; Black 1978; Abramson et all 1992; Herrmann and Pappi 
2008).19 We then create a dummy variable 𝑉2 which assumes the value ‘0’ if the respondent 
chooses her first preference and ‘1’ if she chooses her second preference.20 The core inputs 
into measures of the closeness parameters 𝑝12, 𝑝13 and 𝑝23 are the individual probabilities 
𝑝1, 𝑝2, and 𝑝3, candidates 1, 2, and 3’s respective probabilities of winning the contest. 
Unlike other studies in the BES series, the 2010 survey contains a subjective measure of 
 
18 Part II of the Supporting Information file reproduces all of the specific survey items and 
data sources used in this study. 
19 Alvarez and Nagler (2000) and Alvarez et al. (2006) estimate a Multinomial Probit (MP) 
model whose right-hand side includes demographic, programmatic, and regional inputs to 
raw voter preferences. Blais and Nadeau (1996), Blais et al. (2001) and Blais et al. (2005) 
employ a composite feeling thermometer which simultaneously incorporates preferences 
for candidates, party leaders, and parties. 
20 On other hand if she chooses her third preference she is eliminated from the analysis. In 
the British data, only 15 out 6,830 respondents included in our analysis choose their least-
preferred candidate. Discarding these respondents is a necessary operational step: the ‘0’ 
category would be polluted were it to contain not only the choice for 1 but also the tiny 
subset of respondents which chooses 3. 
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voter expectations: respondents were asked to assign parties a likelihood of winning on a 
1-10 scale.21 We will use the probability-ratio strategy presented in equation (3) to convert 
raw 𝑝𝑗 scores into closeness parameters 𝑝𝑗𝑘. After presenting analyses in which 𝑝𝑗𝑘 is 
constructed from survey respondents’ subjectively reported probabilities of winning 𝑝𝑗, we 
confirm the robustness of our results when 𝑝𝑗𝑘 is constructed using district-level vote 
shares from the previous electoral cycle, an objective proxy for 𝑝𝑗 (section 4a).
  
Canadian elections provide a second example of plurality-rule elections with more 
than two parties. Indeed, since 1993 the Canadian party-system has been even more 
fragmented than the British system, as the effective number of parties in Canada has 
vacillated between four and five. This began with the rise of Reform Party and the Bloc 
Quebecois in 1993, and was continued with the rise of the Green Party since 2004. As 
discussed in the Conclusion, both the COV and our axiomatic approach to measuring 
closeness can be extended to party systems with more than three parties. However, these 
extensions are not trivial, and will require careful proofs which are beyond the scope of the 
current paper. While the 1993-2015 elections in Canada will thus be useful for future work, 
for the present paper we focus on the 1988 Canadian National Election Study (CNES), 
which was a genuinely 3-party contest, and in which respondents were asked to assign 
parties a probability of winning in their local riding. The sample size is much smaller, but 
analysis of the 1988 CNES data represents a second useful robustness check. 
  
4. Statistical analysis of Strategic Voting 
 




, p2 = 
𝑝2
𝑝1+𝑝2+𝑝3






Direct tests of strategic voting should be grounded in the reduced form inequality 
(5) above. Past empirical studies overlook the fact that the hypotheses regarding 𝑝12 and 
𝑝23 which emerge from inequality (5) are interactive with the parameter 𝜎. Take a voter 
who is fairly indifferent between candidates 2 and 3, i.e. for whom 𝜎 is small. By the result 
in (5), increases in 𝑝23 should have little impact on this voter’s likelihood of casting a 
strategic vote. On the other hand, if a voter greatly prefers candidate 2 to candidate 3 (i.e. 
𝜎 is large), then increases in 𝑝23 should have a strong impact on this voter’s likelihood of 
casting a strategic vote. We thus implement the following logistic regression, whose 
dependent variable is the binary variable ‘Vote for 2’:22 
 
       𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑉2 = 1) = {
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑝13 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑝23 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑝12 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝜎
+  𝛽5(𝑝23 ∙ 𝜎) + 𝛽6(𝑝12 ∙ 𝜎) + 𝜀
                           (6) 
 
Per inequality (5), we would expect 𝑝13 (coefficient 𝛽1) to have a negative effect on the 
likelihood of strategic voting. As well, we would expect 𝑝23 and 𝜎 (coefficients 𝛽2 and 𝛽4) 
to have a positive effect on the likelihood of strategic voting, while 𝑝12 (coefficient 𝛽3) to 
have a negative effect. Given that the regression is logistic, we have no a priori expectation 
 
22 The difference between (5) and (6) comes from the inclusion of individual regressors 
𝑝12, 𝑝23, and 𝜎 on the right-hand side, alongside to the multiplicative terms 𝑝23 ∙ 𝜎 and 
𝑝12 ∙ 𝜎. As with any theoretical model whose hypotheses imply interaction effects, the 
regression model must include these individual regressors in order to generate point 
estimates for marginal effects at different levels of the conditioning variable.  
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as to the sign of the interactive coefficients 𝛽5 and 𝛽6. Our hypotheses pertain rather to the 
interactive effects of expectations and preferences described above.  
Part III of the Supporting Information presents summary statistics and correlations 
for all variables. In the tables below we label the jkp  indicators Closeness J-K, and the   
indicator as Utility Differential 2-3. Table 1 presents baseline empirical estimates of voter 














Note:  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
As already noted, the paper’s primary evidence will come from analysis of the 2010 BES 
data, whose results are presented in column 1. Although the data set is much smaller, 
column 3 conducts identical analyses on the 1988 CNES (ignore column 2 for now). Not 
surprisingly, Utility Differential 2-3 ( ) has a positive and statistically significant effect: 
voters are more likely to cast a strategic vote for 2 when they greatly prefer 2 to 3. The 
following table introduces the closeness parameters from the COV as specified in (6).  






















Observations 6,815 1,580 1,418 
Predicted% 93.5% 79.1% 91.3% 











































Note:  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 






  Closeness 1-3 
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Observations   6,815              1,580  1,418    
   Predicted%       93.7%       81.3%        91.5% 
Log Likelihood    -1178.113      -638.61      -363.28 
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Column 1 contains the core analysis from the 2010 BES. Not surprisingly, the percentage 
of correct predictions rises only marginally from Table 1 to Table 2, given the fact that 
strategic voting is a rare event, i.e. that the overwhelming choice of all voters is to choose 
their first preference 1. That said, the log likelihood of the model improves significantly 
upon including the closeness parameters, and likelihood ratio tests demonstrate the superior 
‘fit’ of the regression analysis in Table 2 as compared to Table 1.23  
Beyond this increasing goodness of fit, the expectation parameters are largely 
consistent with theoretical expectations.24 Firstly, the ‘Closeness 1-3’ measure (row 1) 
exerts a significant negative effect on the likelihood of casting a strategic vote: when 1 and 
3 are in a close race for first place, respondents are much more likely to choose 1 than 2. 
This is true for both the British (column 1) and Canadian (column 3) data; Figure 1 presents 




23 The likelihood ratio statistics comparing the models in Table 2 to those in Table 1 are 
equal to 456.6985, 93.8361, and 89.16258 for Columns 1, 2, and 3 respectively. While the 
model fit improves the most for column 1 models, which have by far the most observations, 
the improvement is statistically significant at p<.001 in all three models. 
24 One potential problem with the British data emerges in Scotland, where in some 
constituencies the Scottish National Party (SNP) represents a genuine 4th option. We have 
re-run all analyses dropping respondents from the Scottish constituencies (Supporting 








Figure 1: Closeness of the Race between 1 and 3 
 
 
In the British data, holding all other variables at their means, moving from a value of ‘0’ 
to a value of ‘1’ on 𝑝13 leads to a drop of roughly 6.4% in the likelihood of choosing 2. 
Furthermore, respondents who have a value of ‘1’ on this variable essentially never vote 
strategically. As can be seen in the second plot from Figure 1, this effect is more or less 
replicated in the Canadian sample. The difference is that in the Canadian sample the effect 
is stronger: moving from a value of ‘0’ to a value of ‘1’ on 𝑝13 leads to a drop of roughly 
15.7% in the likelihood of choosing 2. The findings point to a systematic negative effect 
of 𝑝13 on the likelihood of strategic voting in 3-candidate plurality rule elections, which 
holds across distinct electoral contexts, and which is exactly what one would expect based 
on an expected-utility model of voter choice. 
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Rows 2 and 4 from Table 2 report coefficient estimates 2  and 4 , associated with 
the individual regressors 23p  and  . In both columns 1 and 3 the coefficient values 2  
and 4  are positive and significant, which is once again consistent with theoretical 
expectations. However, as already noted, these parameters’ impact should be interactive, 
as captured by the coefficient 5  (row 5). To derive a more complete picture of the effect, 
Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of 23p  on the likelihood of choosing 2 at the highest 
(‘1’) and lowest (‘0’) possible values of  . 
 
Figure 2: Closeness of the Race between 2 and 3 
 
 
The results are consistent with predictions. When 𝜎 = 0, such that voters are essentially 
indifferent between candidates 2 and 3, increasing 
23p  has almost no effect on the 
likelihood of strategic voting, which is close to ‘0’ across the board. On the other hand 
when 𝜎 = 1, and voters are indifferent between candidates 1 and 2, increases in 
23p  have 
a strong and consistent effect. For example, moving from 023 =p  to 123 =p  leads to an 
increase of 53% in the likelihood of choosing 2 in the British data. In the Canadian data, 
the confidence intervals are not as tight, which explains the lack of statistical significance 
 27 
of 5  in column 3. However, the qualitative findings are identical: when 0=  increasing 
23p  has no effect on the likelihood of choosing 2; but when 1=  moving from 023 =p  to 
123 =p  leads to an increase of 62% in the likelihood of choosing 2.  
 Coefficients 𝛽3 and 𝛽6 are associated with the variables 𝑝12 and the interaction 𝑝12 ∙
𝜎 respectively (rows 3 and 6 in Table 2). Consistent with inequality (5)’s predictions, Black 
(1978) and Ordeshook and Zeng (1997) find that as 𝑝12 increases the likelihood of strategic 
voting decreases. In contrast, Abramson et al. (1992) find that increases in 𝑝12 increase the 
likelihood of strategic voting.25 Rows 3 and 6 from Table 2 help to shed light on this issue. 
Beginning again with column 1, we see that the coefficients 𝛽3 and 𝛽6 are statistically 
significant; but that the effects are much weaker than those associated with the coefficients 
𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽4, and 𝛽5. The effect in column 3 is even weaker: in the 1988 CNES analyses 
neither 𝛽3 and 𝛽6 are statistically significant. The marginal effect plots confirm that 
changes in 𝑝12 have essentially ‘0’ effect on the likelihood of choosing 2.  
 
Figure 3: Closeness of the Race between 1 and 2 
 
 
25 Abramson et al. (1992) use a measure of ‘distance’ rather than ‘closeness’, and their 
dependent variable is ‘Vote for 1’. The estimated coefficient thus has a positive sign: as 
the margin between 1 and 2 increases, the likelihood of choosing 1 also increases. 
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This non-finding suggests the presence of a heuristic short-cut by which voters 
simplify the calculus captured in (5): namely, by focusing only on viability comparisons 
which include their least-preferred candidate 3. A large literature exists on the cognitive 
short-cuts voters use to deal with informational constraints and complex choice 
environments (Popkin 1991; Lupia and McCubins1998; Kuklinsky and Quirk 2001; Lau 
and Redlawsk 2001).26 One general message emerging from this literature is that heuristics 
allow voters to behave as if rationally, without actually having to engage in expected-utility 
calculations. The message here is slightly different: discounting 𝑝12 is done not to avoid 
entirely, but rather to simplify, the task of making expected-utility calculations.27  
 
4a. Robustness Checks 
 
26 Related to the current paper, Lago (2008) argues that supporters of far-left parties in 
Spain will cast strategic votes when this most-preferred party has no current district seats 
(and is thus seen as ‘non-viable’). Van der Straeten et al. (2010) argue that voters can avoid 
complex expected-utility calculations in multi-party environments by identifying a 
restricted subset of viable candidates; and then choosing their favorite candidate from 
among this subset. 
27 To deal with possible multi-collinearity and feature space complications, we reran all 
analyses such that they included only one of the two interaction terms (results available 
upon request). The findings were identical: the interaction between   and 23p  is 
statistically and substantively significant, while the parameter 12p  and its interaction with 
  have essentially no effect on the likelihood of choosing 2. 
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Overall, Figures 1-4 uncover striking parallels between the predictors of strategic 
voting in two very different electoral contexts. In most ways, the choice to cast a strategic 
vote for 2 is strongly consistent with the COV’s expectations: voters choose 2 over 1 when 
2 has a better chance of defeating 3, i.e. when 𝑝13 is low and  𝑝23 is high; and the latter 
effect is enhanced when 2 is greatly-preferred to 3. The one result which is not in line with 
the COV, pertaining to the non-effect of 𝑝12, is also consistent across the British and 
Canadian analyses, and suggests the presence of a common short-cut that voters use to 
simplify the calculus derived in (5). Taken together, these results represent some of the 
most convincing, but also nuanced, evidence to date in favor of expected-utility 
maximization as a model of voter choice. We now conduct a series of robustness checks. 
First, we rerun our core model using the previous election’s outcome rather than 
self-reported expectations to measure the raw 𝑝𝑗 scores. The following Figures plot the 
bivariate scatter plots of the self-reported expectations (labeled 𝑝𝑗) on outcomes from the 
previous election (labeled 𝑝𝑗_𝑡_1), along with the associated best fit lines. 
 
Figure 4: Self-Reported Expectations and Previous Election 






The bivariate correlations between 
jp  and jp _t_1 are nearly identical for  3,2,1j  (.641, 
.647, and .648 respectively), as is the S-shape of the best-fit line. In general, candidates 
whose party received 0-15% vote share in the previous election are given low probabilities 
of winning. Estimated probabilities of winning then begin to increase more or less linearly 
with previous vote shares up to the 65% mark, where the ‘S’ once again flattens. We return 
to these findings, and associated avenues for future research, in the Conclusion. Table 3 
replicates regression model (6) on the BES 2010 data set, using the 
jp _t_1 measures to 
create the Closeness indicators 𝑝𝑗𝑘. Using past election returns leads to less missing data 
and thus a larger sample. 
 














Note:  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Differential 2-3 
 













Observations 10,298 2,971 




The estimates in column 1 (ignore for the moment column 2) strongly reinforce the findings 
above. The 𝑝13 measure exerts a statistically significant negative effect on the likelihood 
of casting a strategic vote; the substantive effect is in fact a bit larger than that in Table 2. 
As well, when 𝜎 is large (small) increases in 𝑝23 have a strong (weak) impact on the 
likelihood of choosing 2. Finally, the variable 𝑝12 and its interaction with 𝜎 once again 
have very little impact on the likelihood of strategic voting. These results add confidence 
that the above findings were not driven by our particular choice of raw data.  
As a second robustness check, recall that we have not yet discussed the results from 
column 2 of Tables 2 and 3. These results were generated by estimating (6) on the reduced 
subset of potentially strategic voters. Consider a voter who believes her most-preferred 
candidate 1 will place 1st in the election, and her second and third preferences 2 and 3 will 
place 2nd and 3rd in the election respectively. By definition, this voter should never cast a 
strategic vote, since 1 is a perfectly viable candidate and 3 is expected to place last. More 
generally, Kselman and Niou (2010) prove that strategic voting is possible only if 𝑝2 > 𝑝1, 
i.e. only if 2 has a better chance of winning than 1.28 Roughly 26% (115/444) of 
respondents in the British data choose 2 despite the fact that they do not meet this necessary 
condition.29 These voters present an interesting empirical and theoretical puzzle: why 
would they choose 2 when 1 is a more viable candidate? One distinct possibility is protest 
 
28 This result formalizes an argument originally made by Blais and Nadeau (1996).  
29 Franklin et al. (1994) and Herrmann et al. (2016) also document the presence of voters 
who cast “…strategic votes in the ‘wrong’ direction – away from otherwise viable 
candidates.” (Herrmann  et al. 2016; p. 583) 
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voting: using one’s vote to cast a signal of disaffection with one’s most-preferred party 
(Bowler and Lanoue 1992; Kang 2004; Kselman and Niou 2011), a topic we return to in 
more detail below.  
For the moment, note simply that empirical analyses conducted on the entire sample 
of respondents may thus generate coefficients of ‘strategic’ behavior which are impacted 
by other types of tactical decisions. Column 2 from Table 2 demonstrates that our findings 
are largely robust to running the analysis only on the pool of potential strategic voters. 
Although the coefficients’ substantive size varies slightly, the qualitative implications 
captured in Figures 1-2 are reproduced almost entirely.30 The one slight difference between 
the results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 concerns the effect of 𝑝12. Recall that, according 
to (5), strategic voting should become less likely when 1 and 2 are in a close race (especially 
when 1 is greatly preferred to 2). To the extent that 𝑝12 has any effect at all in column 1, it 
is thus in the wrong direction (see Figure 3 above): when   is sufficiently large voters 
become slightly more likely to choose 2 when the race between 1 and 2 becomes closer 
(see also Abramson et al. 1992).  
Things change slightly when we ‘purge’ the data of potential protest voters. Most 
basically, in column 2 of Table 2, the effect of 𝑝12 continues to be much weaker than those 
associated with 𝑝13 and 𝑝23, and thus the core finding above on heuristics and the 
discounting of 𝑝12 remains unchanged. However, to the extent that 𝑝12 has any effect at all 
 
30 Column 2 from Table 3 conducts the restricted analysis on data using past election 
returns to measure raw expectations. The findings are identical: the coefficients on 𝑝13 and 
𝑝23 are significant and in the right direction; while the results on 𝑝12 are weak and unstable. 
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in column 2, it now moves in the expected direction: voters become less likely to choose 2 
as 𝑝12 increases. The Conclusion suggests that the mixed-findings on 𝑝12, both in the 
current paper and the broader literature, likely emerge from the presence of protest voting 
behavior, and points to future empirical research on electoral signaling which could help 
to complete our understanding of instrumental voter choice. 
As a final robustness check, Part IV of the Supporting Information file (Tables A5-
A10) compares the performance of our probability ratios with the multiplicative and 
difference indices from past research.31 Note that the multiplicative measure, which to our 
knowledge has been used in only one study (Ordeshook and Zeng 1997), is highly correlated 
with our probability ratios.32 Indeed, when we replicate our analysis with the multiplicative 
measure we uncover essentially identical qualitative results on all coefficients (Table A5). 
As discussed in the Supporting Information, Ordeshook and Zeng’s measure only violates 
one subset of cases associated with Property 1, and is the most axiomatically sound of the 
measures used in past research. The parallels between the results thus provide further 
evidence that this paper’s findings are not an artefact of any single functional form for jkp , 
but rather of its axiomatic properties. 
 
31 As demonstrated above, the compound difference and Euclidean indices are essentially 
more nuanced versions of the pure difference measure.  
32 The bivariate correlation for the 12p  measures is r=.837, for the 13p  measures is r=.850, 
and for the 23p  measures is r=.869. The bivariate correlations for the corresponding 
Canadian data are r=.798, r=.830, and r=.884 respectively. 
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The same cannot be said of the difference index, the most commonly applied index 
in past studies of strategic voting. The first thing to note about this index is that all three jkp  
measures cannot be included in a single regression, since 
23p = 13p − 12p . To deal with this, 
Tables A6-A8 run separate models including each possible pair of closeness measures, 
before including the ‘Utility Differential’ and interaction terms in Tables A9-A10 (see also 
Abramson et al. 1992). The exercise leads to a number of conclusions, all discussed at greater 
length in Supporting Information Part IV. Firstly, the models using difference measures 
register significantly worse log-likelihood ratios in all cases. Indeed, adding the difference 
proxies leads to only a marginal improvement in model fit over a regression using only 
‘Utility Differential’. Secondly, the models tend to generate coefficients which move in the 
wrong direction in full sample analyses, but which switch to the right direction when run on 
the restricted sample of potential strategic voters. Finally, in the restricted sample analyses 
the effect of 12p  tends to outweigh the effects of 23p  and 13p . Indeed, it may be that the 
emphasis put in the competitiveness between candidates 1 and 2 in past analyses emerges 
from the use of difference-based measures. While in no way an outright condemnation of 
past studies, this exercise suggests that much past evidence of strategic voting may need to 
be revisited and reinterpreted.  
  
5. Concluding Discussion 
 This paper’s contributions are both methodological and substantive. At the 
theoretical level, we develop an axiomatic approach to measuring the closeness of a race 
between two candidates in a three-candidate election. Methodologically, we propose a new 
proxy measure for closeness, and demonstrate that this new measurement satisfies core 
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axiomatic criteria. Substantively, we use this index to demonstrate some of the most 
consistent but also nuanced evidence to date in favor of expected-utility maximization as a 
model of strategic voting. The choice to cast a strategic vote is driven by viability 
comparisons involving one’s least-preferred candidate, and not by comparing one’s top 
two preferences. Furthermore, the impact of expectations on vote choice is contingent on 
a voter’s preference profile, and in particular the size of their relative preference for 1 over 
2 and 2 over 3. Finally, we demonstrate that past estimates of strategic behavior may have 
been influenced by the presence of protest voting, and propose a strategy for purging 
estimates of this potential source of bias.  
In this Conclusion, we comment on the broader applicability of our methodological 
contribution, and point to new avenues for research which emerge from the paper’s 
substantive results. Note first that the paper’s strategy for measuring closeness can be 
extended to winner-take-all elections with N>3 candidates. Consider for argument’s sake 
a 4-candidate contest, in which voters may not only choose their second-most-preferred 
candidate, but also their third-most-preferred candidate. This would occur when this 3rd 
preference is in a close race for first place with the voter’s least-preferred candidate or 
party, and when this third preference is greatly preferred to this least-preferred candidate.  
No paper has yet derived the full conditions for strategic voting in 4-candidate elections, 
i.e. the equivalent to (5) above, which will be necessary to guide empirical analyses. In this 
core prediction the parameters 1312 , pp , and 23p  will be joined by 2414 , pp , and 34p , 
and the importance of Properties 1 and 2 above will persist: the parameters should increase 
when the 1st-place contest between two candidates tightens, and increase when the 
candidates’ relative standing vis-á-vis the remaining two candidates improves. As noted 
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above, the set of Canadian elections from 1993-2015 will provide a fertile ground for 
testing the model, and thus for determining whether expected-utility continues to be a 
viable model of voter choice in more complex environments.  
 Furthermore, an emerging literature suggests that voters may also engage in 
expected-utility calculations in Proportional Representation systems, where coalition 
government is the norm (Baron and Diermeier 2001; Indriadson 2011; Kedar 2011; 
Herrmann 2014). As emphasized by Herrmann (2014), voters in such systems may choose 
their second-most preferred party so as to secure a more favorable coalition government. 
Herrmann’s expected-utility comparisons generate predictions grounded in the probability 
of being pivotal for distinct coalition outcomes, not unlike the pivotal probabilities which 
emerge from the traditional COV. The current paper’s axiomatic framework, and the ratio 
measures derived in Section 2b, will be important for measuring these pivotal coalition 
probabilities when there are more than two possible coalition outcomes.  
 The paper’s methodology will also be important for future empirical work on protest 
voting and electoral signaling. Recall from above that a non-negligible number of voters 
choose their second-preference 2 despite the fact their first-preference 1 is perfectly viable. 
Table 2 suggests that, as long as 𝜎 is large enough, this subset of voters become more likely 
to choose 2 as 𝑝12 increases. While this goes against the traditional COV’s predictions, it is 
consistent with the extension to the COV developed in Kselman and Niou (2011): increasing 
𝑝12 will increase the expected benefit of protest voting (especially when voters are fairly 
indifferent between 1 and 2), as it will make the loss of a vote especially costly for one’s 
first-preference, and thus be more likely to induce this first preference to improve their 
platform and/or performance. In future work we look forward to studying this subset of 
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voters in more detail, with the aim of painting a more complete picture of instrumental voter 
choice in plurality-rule elections.  
 Note that issues of strategic voting and protest voting are not confined to voting in 
general elections. Although evidence from the US Congress suggests that sophisticated 
voting is rare (Krehbiel and Rivers 1990; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Groseclose and Milyo 
2010), it seems to be present in some notable votes (e.g. Enelow 1981; Calvert and Fenno 
1994). As well increasing evidence suggests the presence of instrumental and tactical voting 
behavior in shareholder elections (Yermack 2010; Harris 2011). Consider the following 
quotation from Yermack’s excellent review of the literature: 
 
“Shareholder voting provides an effective means for shareholders to communicate with the 
board of directors, and boards usually take action in response to clear protest voting.” (p. 
121, italics added) 
 
To the extent that voting behavior in legislatures and shareholder elections is tactical, and 
grounded on expectations over outcomes, this paper’s methodology will be important in 
future empirical studies. 
We now return to the introductory discussion of proxy vs. explicit measures of 
closeness. Comparative analysis of proxy and explicit measures constitutes an important 
avenue for future research. On the technical front, there is room for a broad investigation of 
the axiomatic properties of the distinct probability distributions authors could use to derive 
explicit measures (multinomial, dirichlet, etc.). Firstly, which distributions, or class of 
distributions, satisfy Properties 1-3 above? More ambitiously, do the distinct possible 
distribution functions embody distinct axiomatic assumptions about how voters calculate 
 38 
closeness? If the answers is yes, such work might help move beyond the minimalist criteria 
established in this paper.  
Beyond this theoretical research, empirical work should also investigate the 
comparative performance of explicit as opposed to proxy measures in regression analyses. 
Based on the results in Section 4 and Supporting Information Part IV, our suspicion is that 
explicit measures which satisfy Properties 1-3 will also generate similar substantive findings. 
Of course, science does not advance on the basis of suspicion, and the question remains: 
when faced with multiple ways of measuring jkp , all of which satisfy Properties 1-3, how 
much does the choice of a specific functional form affect regression results? Answering this 
question in future work will provide valuable new insight into the strategies and heuristics 
voters use in making vote choices, and should thus further enrich the axiomatic approach 
developed here.  
As a final point we return to the issue of measuring jp  , the simple probability that 
candidate j wins the election. Figure 4 from Section 4a seems to uncover a fairly systematic 
process by which voters translate district-level vote share expectations into probabilities of 
winning. Parties with previous vote shares in the range of roughly 0-15% receive low 
probabilities of winning; and voters differentiate very little between parties who received 
1% and those who received 15%. Above the threshold of 15%, a party’s probability of 
winning increases more or less linearly with their previous vote share up until it reaches 
65%, at which point the ‘S’ once again flattens. While Figure 4 itself is only suggestive of 
these patterns, the authors have generated some preliminary experimental results which 
point in the same direction. 
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Although further research is necessary, Figure 4 hints at a fairly simple, closed-
form algorithm by which the average voter translates vote shares in the probabilities of 
winning jp . If confirmed, future research can use this algorithm to extract more accurate 
measures of subjective jp  from objective vote shares. As well, for those studies which 
develop explicit measures of jkp , future work could assess whether the values jp  which 
emerge from different density functions look similarly ‘S’-shaped, and prioritize those 
density functions that satisfy this potentially systematic facet of voter choice. As a general 
conclusion, this paper’s overarching framework points in a number of novel directions 
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